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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~~~c.e.H1I~Y T. ITL. E l~S lTH . .AXCE ) 
.\(,E:\( 1, now known as SECURITY 
TITL~J OUARANTY CO.MPANY, 
and ~ J~:t 1 l. HI TY TITLE COM-
P.\XY. l"tah Corporations, 
Plaintiffs-Rf's pond e nts, 
-vs.-
~ECURITY TITLE JXSl~RANCE 
CO~IPAXY, a California Corpora-
t i ()II, 
Defendant -Appclla nt. 
Case No. 9925 
Brief of Defendant-Appellant 
DESIG-XATIOX OF PARTIES 
For convenience the parties will be referred to in 
thi~ brief a~ they were designated in the trial court. The 
.Appellant, Security Title Insurance Company, will be 
referred to either by name or as the Defendant, and the 
Respondents will be referred to by name or as the Plain-
tiffs. 
Page references to the transcript of the trial pro-
reedings will be referred to as (T _______ ). 
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STATEl\iENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiffs against 
the Defendant, Security Title Insurance Company, seek-
ing to restrain the latter cmnpany frmn carrying on its 
business as a title insurance company under its corpo-
rate name of "Security Title Insurance Company," or 
any related or similar name employing the words "Se-
curity Title" and for damages suffered by reason of 
alleged infringement of trade name and for damages suf-
fered by reason of the Defendant having allegedly pre-
vented the Plaintiff, Security Title Guaranty Company, 
from qualifying as a title insurance company in the State 
of Utah (T. 1-5, 46-48). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judgment was granted in favor of Plaintiffs re-
straining the Defendant " ... from doing business in the 
State of Utah under the name, 'Security Title Insurance 
Company' or under any name employing the words, 'Se-
curity Title' in any combination therein, or from using 
said name or words in the solicitation, conduct or carry-
ing on of the business of abstracting, land title exam-
ination, title insurance or any related activity." In addi-
tion the Defendant was ordered to forthwith remove or 
cause to be removed from the window of the premises 
of Stanley Title Company (Defendant's Utah agent) the 
name "Security Title Insurance Company." The Plain-
tiffs' claims for monetary damages were dismissed (T. 
61-62). From the portion of the judgment granting in-
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HELIEF ~<HTGllT 0~ APPEAL 
Dt>fendant seeks a reversal of that portion of the 
judbl'lnent granting injunctive relief in favor of the 
Plaintiff~. rrhe Defendant seeks to be allowed to continue 
to do bu:-;ine~s in this state under its corporate name, 
"SP('Ilrit~· Title Insurance Company," or at least in the 
mune of "~ecurity Title Insurance Company of Los 
AngeiP~, California." 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal brought by Defendant, Security 
TitiP Insurance Company, from a judgment entered 
again~t it in the Third District Court restraining the 
C'ompany ·• ... from doing business in the State of Utah 
undPr the name, 'Security Title Insurance Company,' or 
undPt' any name e1nploying the words, 'Security Title' 
in any combination therein, or from using said nan1e or 
word~ in the solicitation, conduct or carrying on of the 
bm-:inP~s of abstracting, land title exan1inations, title in-
suranee, or any related activity." 
The question prlinarily involved is "·hether or not 
the Defendant, Security Title Insurance Company, should 
1~~· rl'~trained from doing business in the State of Utah 
under its corporate name after having qualified to do so 
with the Insurance Commissioner of this state, and after 
hwing done business in this state for nearly two years. 
Defendant, Security Title Insurance Company, is a 
titlr insurance company and actually engaged in the 
hnsinrss of insuring titles to land, having been organized 
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in the State of California in 1920 (T. 315). Since that 
time it has constantly grown in size until today it is one 
of the large title insurance companies of the United 
States (T. 315). During the last few years it has ex-
panded its operation into several other states (T. 315), 
and on December 6, 1960, it applied to the Utah State 
Insurance Commissioner for a certificate of authority to 
do business in the State of Utah as a foreign title insurer 
under its corporate name (Exhibit No. 22)~ 
In the meantime, however, on December 1, 1944, the 
Plaintiffs were organized and commenced doing business 
in Salt Lake City, Utah (Exhibits Nos. 9, 21). On De·-
cemher 1, 1944, the Plaintiff Security Title Company was 
organized in this state and commenced doing business. 
On August 23, 1957, it changed its name to "Security 
Title Insurance Agency" (Exhibits Nos. 10, 21), and on 
June 27, 1963, its name was again changed to "Security 
Title Guaranty Company" (Exhibits Nos. 11, 21). 
Neither of the Plaintiffs is a title insurance com-
pany, hut merely acts as an agent in acquiring business 
for a title insurer. 
Thus, by the time the Defendant, Security Title In-
surance Company, appJied to the Utah State Insurance 
Commissioner for a certificate of authority to do busi-
ness in this state as a foreign title insurer under its cor-
porate name, the Plaintiff companies had been organized 
in this state. 
The filing of the application by the Defendant com-
pany for a certificate of authority was known to both of 
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the Plaintiff companies, both of which companies vigor-
ously oppost>d the granting of the certificate (T. 190). 
As a matter of fact the Plaintiffs were represented by 
counsel in their efforts to prevent the qualification of 
the Defendant in the State of Utah (T. 190). 
In the month of January, 1961, the Insurance Com-
missioner for the State of Utah approved the Defendant's 
application for a certificate of authority (Exhibit No. 
~~), and on March 25, 1961, in spite of the vigorous op-
position of the Plaintiffs ( T. 190), the Secretary of State 
of Utah issued its certificate, thus completing the De-
fendant'~ qualification as a title insurer in this state (T. 
14, 35). 
Thereupon, having failed in their efforts to prevent 
the Defendant's qualification in the State of Utah, the 
Plaintiff, Security Title Guaranty Company, resorted 
to an outright subterfuge in attempting to "pirate" the 
Defendant's own corporate name by registering the 
same as its own trade name (Exhibit No. 3). In other 
words, the Plaintiff, Security Title Guaranty Company, 
then known as Security Title Insurance Agency, filed an 
application with the Secretary of State for the registra-
tion of the Defendant's name, "Security Title Insurance 
Company," as its own trade-mark or service-mark (Ex-
hibit X o. 3). ~I ark Eggertsen, who signed the applica-
tion under oath as president of Security Title Insurance 
Agency, declared in the application that the name "Se-
curity Title Insurance .Company" had first been used by 
the Plaintiff as its trade name or trade-mark since De-
cember 1, 19-±-1 (Exhibit No. 3). At the trial of the case 
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:Mark Egge-rtsen admitted on eross-examination that 
Security Title Insurance Agency had, as a matter of fart, 
never used the name "Security Title Insurance Company" 
as a trade nan1e or trade-mark ( T. 192, 193). The in-
formation, therefore, contained in the Plaintiff's appli-
cation was patently false (T. 192, 193). 
Following its qualification in this state, the Defend-
ant, subsequently, on April 4, 1961, entered into a contract 
with Stanley Title Company whereby the latteT com-
pany undertook to act as agent in the State of Utah for 
the Defendant, Security Title Insurance Company (T. 
371). 
Stanley Title Company had been organized by 
George Stanley, one of the "oldtimers" in the abstract-
ing and title insurance business (T. 363, 365). 
On March 9, 1962, Stanley Title Company opened 
an office at 60 East Fourth South Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, which location had been recommended by 
).1r. Rogers of Zion Savings Bank (T. 372). This was a 
desirable location for Stanley Title Company to locate 
inasmuch as it was near the City and County Building 
and the Federal Building where records have to be con-
stantly checked (T. 372). The Plaintiffs' offices are at 
45 East Fourth South Street. On its front window in 
large print, running across the center of the ·window, 
Stanley Title Company had printed the words, "Stanley 
Title Company." Immediately underneath the words 
"Stanley Title Company" in large lettering are the words, 
"Title Insurance . Abstracts . Escrows." In small letter-
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ing down in the lower right hand corner of the window 
were printed the words, "State Agent for Security Title 
ln~urance Company, Los Angeles, California." (Exhibit 
,. •)')) 
.,, o .... ._> • 
All of the business done by the Defendant, Security 
Title Insurance Company, in the State of Utah since its 
qualification has been handled through Stanley Title 
Company (T. 322). The Defendant has not solicited any 
busine~~. nor done any advertising. Stanley Title Com-
pany, the etah agent of the Defendant, has done busi-
ness in its own name, that is, "Stanley Title Company," 
nwrely identifying its agency relationship with the De-
fendant on the front window of its business as noted on 
Exhibit 3, and on its letterheads as shown on Exhibit 
Xo. :23. 
A point to be kept in n1ind and which we contend 
i~ Yital to the decision in this case is that the title insur-
ance business is not a business dealing with the public 
generally, but on the contrary is a specialized type of 
business, generally handled by experts and professionally 
qualified people who generally have occasion to deal with 
mo~t of the local title co1npanies, know with whom they 
are dealing, and are generally aware of the respective 
connections with the various title insurance companies 
who actually issue the title insurance policies (T. 205, 
:20t), :20:2, 373, 3 7 ±, 37 6, 427' 436, ±39). 
On June 18, 1962, the Plaintiff, Security Title In-
surance Agency, now known as Security Title Guaranty 
Company, applied to the Commissioner of Insurance of 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the State of Utah, for a certificate of authority to do 
business as a domestic title insurer in this state (Exhibit 
No. 4). The D·efendant, of course, immediately filed an 
objection with the office of the Insurance Commissioner 
to the granting to Security Title Guaranty Company a 
certificate authorizing the latter company to conduct 
business as to title insurer·(Exhibit No.5). 
On June 4, 1962, the Plaintiffs instituted suit against 
the Defendant with the aforementioned results (T. 1, 61). 
It is from this judgment that the Defendant appeals. 
Since this is an equity case, the appeal may be on 
questions of law and fact (Constitution of Utah, Article 
8, Section 9). On review this Court, analogous to a trial 
de novo on the record, should determine from a fair 
preponderance or greater weight of the evidence whether 
or not the findings of the trial court are supported there-
by. Corey v. Roberts, 82 U. 445, 25 P.2d 940; Lawley v. 
Hickenlooper, 61 U. 298, 212 P. 526; Budget System, Inc. 
v. Budget Loam and Finance Plam, 12 Utah 2d 18, 361 
P.2d 512. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS 
OF F A·CT NOS. 12 and 14, IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW NOS. 2 AND 3, AND IN RESTRAINING THE DEFEND-
ANT. 
A. Findings of Fact Nos. 12 and 14, Conclusions of 
Law Nos. 2 and 3 and Decree. 
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Findings of Fact Nos. 12 and 14, Conclusions of Law 
Nos. 2 and 3, and the Decree are so inter-related that 
they are considered together under this Point of Argu-
ment. 
Findings of Fact Nos. 12 and 14 are as follows: 
"12. The words or name 'Security Title' are 
synonymous with the business of plaintiff corpo-
rations. The use by others than those associated 
with plaintiff companies of words 'Security Title' 
in the same general area of business activity, land 
title examinations, abstracts and title insurance 
or any part or function thereof is and will be con-
fusing to those who have occasion to deal with 
such companies. 
"14. If pennitted to do so without restraint 
by this Court, defendant corporation could under 
the name 'Security Title Insurance Company' en-
gage in direct competition with plaintiff corpora-
tions and the affiliates thereof in all parts of the 
land title business to the irreparable injury of 
plaintiffs." 
Conelusions of LawN os. 2 and 3 are as follows: 
"2. The defendant, its respective officers, 
agents, servants and employees and all persons 
whomsoever acting by or for the defendant should 
be restrained from the use of the words or names 
'Security Title' in any way within the State of 
Utah, in connection with the business of land 
titles, abstracts or title insurance, and defendant 
should be permanently enjoined from doing busi-
ness as a title insurer in the State of Utah under 
the name Security Title Insurance Company or 
lmder any name in which the words 'Security 
Title' appear in any combination whatever. 
9 
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"3. Defendant should be ordered to remove 
forthwith the name 'Security Title Insurance 
Company' from the office window at 60 East 4th 
South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah and should be 
allowed a period of 90 days in which to either 
qualify under another name as a title insurer in 
the State of Utah or to withdraw therefrom. Dur-
ing such period defendant or its agent, Stanley 
Title, should be permitted to use the preliminary 
report forms such as exhibit 35, and the letter-
heads which bear the name Security Title Insur-
ance Company in small letters, but during such 
90 day period no enlargement of use of said 
names should be permitted and thereafter defend-
ant should be permanently restrained from use 
of such name or any name embodying the words 
'Security Title' in doing business in the State of 
Utah." 
The Decree entered by the trial court provided in 
part as follows : 
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DE'CREED that the defendant, Security 
Title Insurance Company, its respective officers, 
agents, servants and employees and any person 
or corporation acting by or for defendant in any 
cap:acity be, and each of them is hereby prohibited, 
restrained and enjoined from doing business in 
the State of Utah under the name, 'Se-curity Title 
Insurance Company,' or under any name employ-
ing the words, 'Security Title' in any combination 
therein, or from using said name or words in the 
solicitation, conduct or carrying on of the busi-
ness of abstracting, land title examination, title 
insurance or any related activity. 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDG-
ED AND DECREED that defendant forthwith 
10 
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remove or cause to be removed from the window 
of the premises occupied by said Stanley Title 
Company, agent of defendant, at 60 East -!th 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, the name 'Security 
Title Insurance Company.' " 
B. Contention of Defendant, Security Title Insur-
ance Company. 
rrhe Defendant contends that having qualified as a 
foreign insurer in this state with the Insurance Conunis-
sionPr it thereupon was and is free to use its corporate 
name in the pursuit of its business as long as it does 
not do so in such a \vay as to cause or probably cause 
confusion. The evidence, as will be pointed out here-
after, does not support Findings Nos. 12 and 1-1, Conclu-
sions of Law Nos. 2 or 3, nor upon the Decree as entered. 
On the contrary the record shows that both Plaintiffs 
and Defendant deal generally with a professional, in-
fonned clientele; that the Plaintiffs and Defendant are 
not competitors inasmuch as the Defendant is a title 
insurance company, while the Plaintiffs are merely title 
insurance agencies; that the words "security" and "title" 
are in common use and generic in character; that the 
Defendant has, since its operation, taken considerable 
care to properly identify itself so that in nearly two 
years of operation there has been no confusion, nor is 
there any reasonable probability of confusion in the 
future. 
C. Review of Law Controlling the Case. 
The Court's attention is first invited to the legal prin-
ciples controlling the case. The essential inquiry is 
11 
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whether or not there is confusion or a probability of con-
fusion. In considering this question, the Court should 
examine, among other things, the nature of the business 
and the class of persons patronizing the same, how the 
names are actually being used, the nature of the words 
involved in the names, and the competition or lack there-
of between the parties. 
(1) The Essential Question. 
The essential question is always whether or not there 
is confusion or a probability of confusion. 
Said the court in Federal Securities Co. v. Federal 
Securities Corp., 276 P. 1100 (Ore., 1929), 66 A.L.R. 934, 
946: 
"The ultimate question is always whether 
trade is being unfairly diverted, and whether the 
public is being eheated into the purchase of some-
thing which it is not in fact getting; the c'Ourts 
interfere solely to prevent deception. 
* * * 
"When it has been found that there is a simi-
larity of names, a court does not cease its in-
quiries and at once grant relief, but proceeds to 
ascertain whether the other facts are such that 
deception and injury are l~kely." 
(2) The Importance of the Nature of the Bus.iness. 
The nature of the business involved and the class of 
persons patronizing the same are particularly important. 
"The class of persons who patronize the par-
ticular business or who buy the particular kind 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of article manufactured, such as servants or chil-
dren, on the one hand, or persons skilled in the 
particular trade on the other, must be considered 
in determining the question of probable deception; 
in every case the court should determine the ques-
tion by placing itself in the position of the aver-
age person to whom the appeal for patronage is 
directed. Furthermore, the apprehension of con-
fusion because of similarity of names is less in 
noncompetitive than in competitive businesses." 
87 C.J.S., Trade-Marks, Etc., Sec. 92, page 332. 
Authorities on this point have been collected by the 
annotator in 115 A.L.R. 1.241, 1245: 
··As was pointed out in the original annota-
tion, the status of the corporations in the com-
mercial field-e.g., the character of the business 
and of the products, and the placE' where the busi-
ness is carried on-often has an important bear-
ing on the right of a corporation to protection 
against the use of its name by another corpora-
tion. 
"This principle has been applied in two re-
cent c>ases in connection with the differences 
between the business of insurance corporations 
and the business of ordinary trading or commer-
cial corporations. 
"Thus, in Standard Acci. Ins. Co. v. Standard 
Surety & C. Co. (1931; D.C.) 53 F. (2d) 119, it 
was held that since the business of casualty in-
surance and surety companies is conducted 
through insurance agents or brokers or with the 
insurance experts of large concerns rather than 
with the general public, a greater degree of simi-
larity is permitted in respect of the corporate 
names of such companies. 
13 
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"And in Central Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Cen-
tral Mut. Ins. Co. (1936) 275 Mich. 554, 267 N.\V. 
733, it was said: 'There is probably greater lati-
tude allowed to banks and insurance companies 
in the similarity of corporate names than in the 
case of ordinary mercantile corporations.'" 
See also Federral Securities Co. v. Federal Securities 
Corp., 276 P. 1100 (Ore., 1929), 66 A.L.R. 934; 66 A.L.R. 
948, 962. 
(3) The Significance of the Nature of the Name. 
The nature of the names themselves must also be 
considered. In Truck Ins. Exchange v. Truck Ins. Ex-
change, 1940, 165 Or. 332, 107 P.2d 511, 523, both the 
plaintiff and the defendant used the term "Truck Insur-
ance Exchange'' in their respective business names. Plain-
tiff sought to enjoin the use of the term by defendants as 
a part of its business name. In denying relief the court 
said: 
"No one can dip into the common vocabulary 
and, selecting some generic or descriptive words 
which commonly designate the business activities 
in which people engage, as, for instance, grocery 
store, appropriate the words to himself and there-
by forbid their use by others who desire to launch 
similar enterprises. The words 'Truck Insurance 
Exchange,' which both the plaintiff and one of the 
defendants employ as their names, is a term of 
that kind and, therefore, incapable of exclusive 
appropriation. 
* • * 
"It is always the business., and not the name, 
which is protected in suits of this character." 
14 
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A greater degree of sin1ilarity will be allowed where 
the nrunes an· geographical or descriptive. Said the court 
in FcdcralS('curitics Co. v. Federal Securities Corp., 276 
P. 1100 (Ore., 1929) : 
"A great degree of similarity in names will 
be tolerated where they are geographical or de-
scriptive than where the first corporation's name 
is fanciful and arbitrary." 
It is also important to note that meTe similarity is 
not sufficient to warrant an injunction. There must be 
a use of the similar name which causes mistake as to 
identity before a court of equity will permit an injunc-
tion to issue, and then the injunction will issue only 
as to the particular use and not as to the similarity. 
In Em,ployers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Employers' 
Liability Ins. Co., 10 N.Y Supp. 845, 847, the court said: 
"The rule as to the use of names where both 
parties are entitled to the same name, and in 
cases where no fraud or deceit is charged or 
proven, (as in this case) has been stated in Men-
eely v. Meneely, 62 N.Y. 427, and it is there held 
that such confusion as results merely from simi-
larity will not be a ground for injunction, but 
where, even innocently, a defendant so uses his 
name .as to cause mistake as to identity, and to 
induce the public to believe that he is the plaintiff, 
the general use of the name will not be enjoined, 
but the particular manner of the use which causes 
the mistake, confusion, and consequent injury will 
be." 
The Supreme Court of California has similarly held 
in the case of American Automobile Ass'n. v. American 
A11fomobile 0. Ass'n., 13 P.2d 707, 712: 
15 
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"Since plaintiff had no exclusive property 
right by way of trade-mark in the use of the name, 
it follows that the mere similarity of names does 
not establish the fraud. It must be such a mis-
use of the name by advertising and soliciting as 
amounts to fraud, and without this proof no re-
lief may be granted, .... " 
With regard to similarity of names the Court should 
take cognizance of the words in the name that are descrip-
tive and if it is the descriptive words that cause the con-
fusion, there are no grounds for an injunction. 
In Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Employers' 
Liability Ins. Co., 10 N.Y. Supp. 845, 846, the court said: 
"The words (Employers Liability) have be-
come descriptive of one kind of insurance busi-
ness, just as the words 'fire,' 'marine,' 'accident,' 
'life,' indicate other kinds of insurance. ' ... those 
words, therefore', have become the general desig-
nation of a certain kind or department of the 
insurance business, and do not express proprietor-
ship or origin, and, while the plaintiff was the 
pioneer in this particular branch of underwriting, 
and the first to use the words referred to, it has 
not shown such a present exclusive right as would 
justify the injunction on that ground.'" 
As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Del. & H. Camal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 20 L. Ed. 
581: 
"True, it may be that the use by a second pro-
ducer, in describing truthfully his product, of a 
name or a combination of words already in use 
by another, may have the effect of causing the 
public to mistake as to the origin or ownership of 
the product; but if it is just as true in its applica-
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tion to his goods as it is to those of another who 
first applied it and who, therefore, claims an ex-
clusive right to use it, there is no legal or moral 
wrong done. Purchasers may be mistaken, but 
thray are not deceived by false representations, and 
equity will not enjoin against telling the truth." 
(-l) Hmr the Names Are Acht.ally Being Used. 
rl'he Court's attention is invited to such cases as 
Saunders v. Sun L. Assur. Co. (1894) 1 Ch. (Eng.) 537. 
noted in 66 A.L.R. 948, 983, where the defendant company 
was ordered to print the words "of Oanada" in as promi-
nent lettering as the preceding words; Farmers Loan 
& T. Co. v. Farmers Loan & T. Co. (1888) 21 Abb. N.C.104, 
1 N.Y. Supp. +±,noted in 66 A.L.R. 948, 982, where the 
court pennitted the use of the words, "Fanners Loan & 
Trust Co.," providing the words "of Kansas" were added; 
International Trust Co. v. Internat.ional Loan & T. Co. 
( ts91) 153 :Mass. 271, 10 L.R.A. 758, 26 N.E. 693, and 
noted in 66 A.L.R. 948, 982, where the requirement was 
8imply made that there be adequate identification; and 
the case of Federal Securities Co. v. Federal Securities 
Corp., 276 P. 1100 (Ore., 1929), 66 A.L.R. 934, where the 
plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from the use 
of its corporate name, the decree of the Circuit Court 
was upheld, dismissing the complaint and allowing the 
defendant to continue to do business in the State of Ore-
gon. but ordered the defendant to continue the practice 
of using the phrase "of Illinois" in connection with its 
name, and directed that it should be in type, as large, 
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( 5) Competition or Lack Thereof. 
The Court's attention is invited to Truck Insurance 
Exchange v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 107 P.2d 511, 
165 Or. 332 (1940), where the plaintiff was authorized 
" ... to maintain an agency for the issuing, writing and 
selling policies of insurance issued by the regularly in-
corporated insurance companies. . .", and the defend-
ant solicited insurance business in a different way as an 
insurance exchange. The court held at page 524: 
"Even if we assume that the plaintiff con-
ducted an insurance agency, that type of business 
and the one in which the defendants are engaged 
are so different that, unless the defendants change 
their business or their methods, the possibility of 
the public being misled is too remote to entitle 
the plaintiff to an injunction; .at least the record 
fails to indicate that any member of the public 
has been misled." 
(6) Analysis of Leading Cases. 
Standard Ace. Ins. Co. v. Standard Surety & Casual-
ty Co. of New York, 53 F. 2d 119 (District Court, S.D. 
New York, 1931), is a leading case in this area of the 
law. Involved was a suit to restrain the defendant from 
using its corporate name, "Standard Surety & Casualty 
Co. of New York," or any other name containing the word 
"Standard," on the ground that such use would consti-
tute unfair competition with the plaintiff, which had the 
name "Standard Accident Insurance Company." Both 
companies were insurance companies engaged only in 
the casualty and surety fields throughout the United 
18 
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StatPs and were in din·et cmnpetition with each other. 
'Phe plaintiff was incorporated in 1884 in :Michigan and 
had heen li<'Pnsed to do business in every state for many 
yt>ars and in ~ ew York since 1888. The defendant was 
ineorporated in 1928 in New York, and its business had 
bt1t•n gradually increasing. The question presented was 
whether the defendant by the mere use of its own cor-
porate na1ne in the casualty insurance and surety fields 
infringed any rights of the plaintiff. The court toO'k cog-
nizan<'e of the exceedingly valuable good will of the plain-
tiff, but also noted that the defendant's name was chosen 
in good faith and without any desire to have it confused 
with the plaintiff's. The court also noted the strong 
8imilarity between the names and the use by each com-
pany of the word "Standard": 
"There is, of course, a strong similarity be-
tween the two names. While they have only one 
word in common, 'Standard,' that is the dominant 
element in each and, though not highly distinctive, 
is sufficient to cause some confusion in the minds 
of the general public. It is a common descriptive 
word connoting stability, general recognition, and 
conformity to established practice; and it to some 
extent suggests that the company issues the stat-
utory standard form of policies." 
The court then considered the nature of the busi-
m•ssPs involved and the type of people with whom each 
dealt: 
''In determining the effect of this similarity, 
due weight should be given to the system em-
ployed by casualty and surety companies in get-
ting business. Unlike the life insurance compan-
ws, they make no direct appeal to the general 
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public. The applications are brought to them by 
brokers or agents who have generally secured 
the business without regard to the company in 
which it is to be placed. At least 95 per cent of 
all the persons who apply to the agents and 
brokers are not at all concerned about what com-
pany is to issue the policy; faith in the broker 
or agent and in the state insurance department 
is substituted for reliance upon the reputation 
of the individual company. As to them, the name 
of the company is not considered and its possible 
confusion with another is immaterial. The re-
maining 5 per cent of the applicants (whose busi-
ness, however, is 15 to 20 per cent of the total) 
are practically all insurance experts, such as in-
surance m~nagers of large industrial corpora-
tions, and they choose the company after an in-
vestigation of its record and resources. With 
them a mere similarity in names would gen-
erally he insufficient to cause confusion. 
"The good will of casualty and surety com-
panies is, therefore, not so closely tied up to their 
names as is that of commercial companies or even 
life insurance corporations, and a similarity is not 
so important to them. The' brokers, agents, and 
insurance managers who actually decide in what 
company to place the business are sufficiently 
familiar with the personnel, location, etc., of the 
various companies that they could not be misled 
by mere similarity ·of names as the general public 
would be. This is shown by the large number of 
insurance companies with very similar names." 
The court then made the following conclusion: 
"The conclusion that must he drawn, there-
fore, is that the possibility of confusing the gen-
eral public is by no means the test to be applied, 
and that the professional insurance men and ex-
20 
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perts who are in a sense the plaintiff's public, 
are not likely to be misled merely by the degree 
of similarity in this case." 
The <'Ourt thereupon held that the plaintiff was not 
Pntitled to appropriate to its exclusive use so common 
and <lPsirahle a word as "Standard." 
Central Milt. Auto Ins. Co. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 
~ti7 N. \Y. 733 (.Mich. 1936) is a more recent and most 
significant decision. In this case the plaintiff, a domestic 
insurance company with its principal place of business in 
Detroit, Michigan, sought to restrain the defendant, a for-
eign insurance company admitted to do business in 
the State of l\1ichigan, from using the name "Central 
:\[ utu.al Insurance Company" in the State of 1\:Iichigan. 
The question in the case was whether the name of 
the defendant so closely resembled the name of the plain-
tiff that its use should be enjoined. The case has a strik-
ing- similarity to the instant case inasmuch as the defend-
ant company had been admitted to do business in the 
State of ni ichigan by the Commissioner of Insurance. On 
this point the court stated: 
"The action of the commissioner of insurance 
indicates he was not impressed that confusion 
would arise from defendant's admission to do 
business in the state. Young & Chaffee Furniture 
Co. v. Chaffee Bros. Furniture Co., 204 :\Iich. 293, 
170 X.W. -!S. The action of the commissioner of 
insurance in authorizing defendant to do business 
in this state is the action of a public official to 
whom has been delegated the power of preventing 
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any wrong to plaintiff by reas·on of the similarity 
of the name of defendant with that of plaintiff, 
and his action is entitled to respect. His deter-
mination, while not final and conclusive, is entitled 
to great weight and is not to be set aside or over-
thrown without positive proof of substantial in-
jury or probable injury to plaintiff. Mere fear 
or possibility of injury is not sufficient. Young & 
Chaffee Furniture Co. v. Chaffee Bros. Furniture 
Co., supra." 
The court then turned to the vital question of confu-
siOn: 
"There may be some confusion resulting from 
the similarity of the names of plaintiff and de-
fendant, but the confusion of which the court 
takes cognizance must be something more than 
that resulting from carelessness or ignorance on 
the part of the uninformed. The strong arm of a 
court may not, in equity and good conscience, be 
invoked on account of anything over which de-
fendant has no control. Defendant is not an in-
surer against the ignorance or carelessness of 
particular individuals and may be enjoined from 
the use of its corporate name after admission to 
do business in the state by the commissioner of 
insurance by that name, only upon a showing the 
similarity of its name to that of plaintiff will mis-
lead, or probably mislead, the public to the detri-
ment or injury of plaintiff. Federal Securities Co. 
v. Federal Securities Corporation, 129 Or. 375, 
276 P. 1100, 66 A.L.R. 934; 6 Fletcher on Corpora-
tions ( 1931 Ed.) p. 55. 
"There is probably greater latitude allowed 
to banks and insurance companies in the simi-
larity of corporate names than in the case of 
ordinary mercantile corporations. New York Trust 
Co. v. New York County Trust Co., 125 Misc. 735, 
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~ll N. Y.S. 785; Standard Accident In~. Co. v. 
Standard Surety & Casualty Co. (D.C.) 53 F. (~d) 
11~)." 
The court then pointed out that it could only con-
~ider the eorporate names as such and not popular ab-
breviations of the same: 
"Plaintiff claims that notwithstanding its 
corporate name it has become known by the name 
'Central Mutual Insurance Company' and as 'Cen-
tral .Mutual,' and its insurance policies as 'Cen-
tral' policies. This is immaterial. The plaintiff 
must stand or fall on its corporate name. The 
statutes above quoted recognize the corporate 
name only. Detroit Savings Bank v. Highland 
Park State Bank of Detroit, 201 :Mich. 601, 167 
N.W. 895." 
Then the court said : 
"The cases of confusion in business between 
the two insurance companies here involved are, 
under the prO'of, trivial in character, and within 
the rule of Saunders v. Sun Life Assurance Com-
pany of Canada (1894), 1 Ch. 537; Standard Acci-
dent Ins. Co. v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co .. 
supra; New York Trust Co. v. New York County 
Trust Co., supra." 
The court concluded by holding in favor of the de-
fendant and reversing the trial court which had re-
strained the defendant. 
Another leading case is Lawyers T.itle Ins. Co. v. 
Lall'yers Title Ins. Corporation, 109 F.2d 35, cert den 309 
r .S. 68-!, 60 S. Ct. 806, S-! L. Ed. 1028. This case involved 
a suit by Lawyers Title Ins. Co. against Lawyers Title 
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Ins. Corporation for an injunction restraining the de-
fendant corporation from using its corporate name in 
engaging in the business of insuring real estate titles 
in the District of Columbia. The corporate names of 
the plaintiff and defendant were identical except in the 
difference in the words "Company" and "Corporation." 
On appeal the judgment dismissing the action in 
favor of the defendant was affirmed. The defendant at-
tempted to induce the plaintiff to become its agent in 
the District of Columbia, hut the plaintiff declined. Fail-
ing to find another satisfactory agent, defendant quali-
fied in the District of Columbia in 1935 and in 1938 open-
ed its own office less than a block distant from the plain-
tiff's. The following excerpt from the opinion sets forth 
the pertinent findings of the trial court: 
"The trial court found that defendant's en-
trance into the District was 'in the process of the 
natural and logical development of its business,' 
not only for expansion but to give more efficient 
service to existing customers ; that the location 
of its office was selected, not to divert business 
~tnfairly from plaintiff, but because of its near-
ness to offices of real estate brokers and others 
having title business; that defendant did not 
choose its name originally in order to lure busi-
ness from plaintiff (in fact at that time it had no 
intention of competing with plaintiff) ; and that 
defendant has done all that reasonably could be 
required of it to prevent confusion of identity 
with plaintiff. 
"Evidence sustaining the latter finding shows 
that on defendant's office door, letterheads, forms, 
signs, advertising and telephone listings, it h~s 
added to the statement of its corporate name d1s-
24 
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tinguishing matter, such as 'Home Office-Rich-
mond, Yirginia Washington Branch.' Similary dis-
tinguishing identification is made orally in an-
swering telephone calls. Distinctive type, color 
and arrangement, not similar to those used by 
plaintiff, are employed in signs, letterheads, 
fonns, etc. 
"The court found further that title certifi-
cates and policies are obtained in Washington 
principally by real estate brokers and lawyers for 
their clients, and by banks, insurance companies, 
}oan and trust companies and building associa-
tions, all of whom are experienced in title matters. 
will not be misled by the similarity of names, and 
constitute a discriminating clientele; that there is 
no evidence disclosing any injury to plaintiff by 
defendant's conduct; and that there is no reason-
able probability that plaintiff will suffer injury· 
on account of confusion of identity with defend-
ant, in view of the dissimilarity in publicity cre-
ated by defendant." 
Pursuant to these findings the court denied relief 
to the plaintiff and dismissed the bill on three grounds: 
(1) that plaintiff has not shown such similarity of names 
by which it and defendant are known publicly as to de-
ceive plaintiff's customers and divert their business to 
defendant; ( 2) that defendant has done all that reason-
ably could be required to prevent confusion of identities; 
and ( 3) that the services in question are rendered to a 
discriminating clientele, who will not be misled by "any 
fortuitous similarity" of the corporate names. 
The Court of Appeals held that the findings of fact 
were sustained bY the evidence and that the judgment 
of the trial court was right. The court noted that the 
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names were practically identical and that there was no 
deliberate attempt by one competitor to simulate another 
or e·mploy a crafty scheme for luring a-way business by 
deception. Said the court : 
"Their subjective attitudes, if material, are 
not fraudulent or dishonest." 
The court noted the essential question in this case 
in the following language: 
"The naked question is whether plaintiff has 
an exclusive right, by virtue of prior appropria-
tion in this jurisdiction, to use the name which 
each has acquired lawfully and with honest pur-
pose." 
The court observed the plaintiff's contention, which 
Is essentially the contention of the plaintiff in the in-
stant case: 
"Plaintiff contends, however, that it has ac-
quired in its name a more absolute right, un-
qualified by necessity for showing such injury 
or danger of public confusion. Defendant's right 
to do business in the District is not, and could 
not well be, disputed. But if defendant does so, 
plaintiff asserts, in effect, that it must use a new 
name, different from that in which it has been 
incorporated and with which it has built good will 
in many places. It is the name, therefore, and not 
merely the business which is done in it, to which 
plaintiff claims exclusive title and use. Prior in 
tempore prior ( et sol us) in jure est summarizes 
plaintiff's view." 
S.aid the court: "We find no authority to sustain 
a right so absolute." 'The court refused to recognize an 
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ah:-;olutP right to the name created merely by in('orpora-
tion eft't-etive to exclude others regardless of time and 
1·i rcumstance. The court viewed the decision as one to be 
base on prin('iples of unfair trade. The court did note a 
lack on the part of the plaintiff in building and maintain-
ing good will exclusively and distinctively about its 
present corporate name. The court further noted that 
thP probability of confusion was "reduced further by 
the experienced and discriminating character of the clien-
tele to which defendant and the plaintiff's combination 
appeal, and the care defendant has taken to add distin-
guishing matter to its name in publicity and solicitation." 
The court noted that occasional misunderstanding might 
()('('llr despitL• these precautions, but said: " ... there is 
nothing to show probability of more than that, and in 
it~Plf that does not justify the drastic relief here sought." 
The court's observations on the generic character 
of the words and the status of the corporation, are like-
wi~e apparent: 
"'Ve have made no point of the fact that 
plaintiff's name appears to be composed of gen-
eric words, W'hich could not be registered as a 
trademark and which considerable authority in-
dicates cannot be appropriated exclusively by in-
corporation. Nor do we think it material that de-
fendant is a foreign corporation competing with 
domestic ones, since the District of Columbia has 
no statute placing the former on a peculiar basis 
and we deem the case to be governed by concep-
tions of tmfair trade, which make no distinction 
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The annotator in 66 A.L.R. 9-!8 at page 983 has cited 
other cases involving insurance companies. In each in-
stance noted, the defendant companies were' permitted 
to continue to operate : 
"-'Commercial Union Assurance Co., Limit-
ed,' and 'Commercial Union Life Insurance Co. of 
New York' (the first company was authorized 
to carry on only a fire and marine insurance busi-
ness, while the second company was purely a life 
insurance company; but the court said that, in-
dependently of this difference, the names were not 
so similar as to mislead), Commercial Union As-
sur. Co. v. Smith (1888) 2 N.Y. Supp. 296; 
" - 'Continental Insurance Company of the 
City of New York' and 'Continental Fire Associa-
tion of Ft. Worth, Texas' (reliance was placed 
upon the different plans under which the two com-
panies did business, the former issuing policies 
for fixed premiums only, and the latter doing 
business on the mutual plan ; and upon the fact 
that the business was all done through .agents, 
who were well aware of the difference in names), 
Continental Ins. Co. v. Continental Fire Asso. 
(1900) 41 C. C. A. 326, 101 Fed. 255; 
"-'Guardian Fire & Life Assurance Co.' and 
'Guardian Horse, Vehicle, & Gene~r.al Insurance 
Co.' (upon an offer by defendants to assume the 
latter name instead of 'Guardian & General In-
surance Co. (Limited),' which was held to consti-
tute an infringement, the court said that this 
would be satisfactory), Guardian F. & L. Assur. 
Oo. v. Guardian & G. Ins. Co. (1880) 50 L. J. Ch. 
N.S. (Eng.) 253; 
"-'London & Provincial Law Assurance So-
ciety' and 'London & Provincial Joint-Stock Life 
Insurance Co.' (where the first company w.as a 
28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
society of la,vyers, and the second company was 
composed of Inercan tile n1en; and where length 
of usage of the nrune by the first company was not 
shown), London & P. Law Assur. Soc. v. London 
& P. Joint-Stock L. Im.;. Co. (lH-!7) 11 Jur. (Eng.) 
938: 
''-'London Assurance' and 'London & \r e:->t-
minster Assurance Corporation (Limited),' Lon-
don Assurance v. London & W. Assur. Corp. 
(1863) 3~ L.J. Ch. N.S. (Eng.) 664; 
" -'Society of l\lotor :Manufacturers & Trad-
ers, Ld.,' and 'Motor Manufacturers' & Traders' 
:\lutual Insurance Co., Ld.' (the facts that the 
c01npanies were not engaged in the same line of 
business, and that the words used were generi<', 
however, were the principal ground for the de-
cision), Society of :Motor l\Ifrs. & Traders v. 
:Motor Mfrs' & T. Mut. Ins. Co. (1925) 1 Ch. 
(Eng.) 675; 
" - 'Sun Life Assurance Society' and 'Sun 
Life Assurance Co. of Canada' (the defendant 
company· was ordered, however, to print the words 
'of Canada' in as prominent lettering as the pre-
ceding words; the defendant company had been in 
existence for several years in Canada, although it 
had not done any business in England; and the 
court expressly noted that it was not a case of a 
newly organized company seeking to benefit by 
the name of an older company), Saunders v. Sun 
L. Assur. Co. (189-±), 1 Ch. (Eng.) 537; 
" - 'Travelers Insurance Co.' and 'Travelers 
Insurance Machine Co.' (the character of the 
words as generic terms, and the fact that the cor-
porations were not in the same line of business, 
were the principal grounds for the decision, how-
ever), Travelers Ins. Mach. Co. v. Travelers Ins. 
Co. (1911) 142 I{y. 523, 13± S.W. 877 (rehearing 
in (1911) 1±3 I{y. 216, 136 S.\V. 15-t) ;" 
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Ban:ks and trust con1panies, like insurance compan-
ies, have been permitted to have a greater degree of 
similarity in their names, and the annotator in 66 A.L.R. 
948 at page 982 notes three such decisions: 
" - 'Farmers Loan & Trust Co.' and 'Fann-
ers Loan & Trust Co. of Kansas' (temporary 
injunction issued, forbidding the use, of the words 
'Farmers Loan & Trust Co.,' but permitting such 
use if the words 'of Kansas' were added), Farm-
ers Loan & T. Co. v. Farmers Loan & T. Co. 
(1888) 21 Abb. N.C. 104,1 N.Y. Supp. 44; 
"-'Fidelity Bond & Mortgage Co.' and 'Fi-
delity Bond & l\fortgage Co. of Texas' (in this 
case, however, the evidence showed that the for-
mer company did very little business in Texas, 
and had not exclusively appropriated the field, 
and this seemed to be more the controlling factor 
than the dissimilarity in names), Fidelity Bond & 
Mortg. Co. v. Fidelity Bond & Mortg. Co. (1929; 
D.C.) 33 F. (2d) 580; 
* * * 
'' - 'International Trust Co.' and 'Interna-
tional Loan & Trust Co. of Kanasas City,' or 'In-
ternational Loan & Trust Co. of Kansas City, 
Mo.' (words 'of Kansas City' or 'of Kansas City, 
Mo.,' being made equally conspicuous with pre-
ceding words), International Trust Co. v. Inter-
national Loan & T. Co. (1891) 153 Mass. 271, 10 
L.R.A. 758, 26 N.E. 693 ;" 
The case of International Trust Co. v. International 
Loan & Trust Co., 26 N.E. 693 (Mass., 1891) is particu-
larly in point. The plaintiff was a Massachusetts corpo-
ration organized and doing business in that state. The 
defendant was a Missouri corporation, orginally char-
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tPrPd nndPr the name of "Xational Loan & Trust Com-
puny," wlti('h ruune was later changed by vote of the 
:-;t()(·kholders to ''International Loan & Trust Company." 
'l 1he plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from carry-
ing on its businPss in nlassachusetts under its corporate 
nmne, contending that the name of the defendant was so 
nearly identieal with the naine of plaintiff that it was 
liabiP to mislead, and had in fact misled, the public, 
p:-;pPeially persons having occasion to deal with plain-
tiff. 
At the hearing the plaintiff introduced testimony 
tPnding to show that defendant's corporate naine would 
mislead, and in fact had misled, the public, but the pre-
~iding justice ruled, apart from that evidence, that the 
defendant's corporate name was so nearly identical with 
the plaintiff's as to mislead. The defendant contended 
that the name under which it had in fact done business in 
tlw state of :Massachusetts was not "International Loan 
& Trust Company" but "International Loan & Trust 
Company of l{ansas City," or "International Loan & 
Tnt~t Cmnpany of Kansas City, ~iissouri," and that this 
name was not so nearly identical with plaintiff's as to 
mislead. 
The evidence showed that with a few minor excep-
tions in all its circulars and advertisements the words 
"Kansas City" were printed in conspicuous type and in 
connection with the nan1e. The court was of the opinion 
that defendant's corporate name was so nearly identical 
with plaintiff's that it would mislead, but took cognizance 
of the fact that even if there were a similarity of corpo-
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rate names, the defendant in carrying on its business 
had always appended further identifying words. The 
following language of the court is most significant: 
"On the other hand, even if the corporate 
name of a foreign corporation was the same, or 
nearly identical with that of a domestic corpora-
tion, but it did not carry on its business under 
such name, but under a different and dissimilar 
one, there would seen1 to be no reason why it 
should be enjoined. No harm would be done, and 
nobody would suffer. We think, also, the question 
whether the names are so nearly identical as to 
mislead must be settled by the application of the 
principles which apply to analogous cases respect-
ing trade-marks. As already noted, the presiding 
justice found that the words 'of Kansas City' 
had been printed, with a few minor exceptions, 
in all its circulars and advertisements, in con-
spicuous type, and in connection with the name. 
It also appears from the reported evidence that 
the sign upon the windows of the office in Boston 
was 'International Loan & Trust Company of 
Kansas City, Missouri,' in letters, as we infer, 
all of large size ; that on the letter and note and 
account heads used by it were printed in large 
letters of equal size the words, 'International 
Loan & Trust Co., of Kansas City, Mo.'; that the 
imprint on envelopes mailed by it to parties was 
'International Loan & Trust Co., of Kansas City, 
Mo.," all in letters of the same and of a fair size; 
that upon the envelopes furnished to return to it 
the same title was printed, the words 'of Kansas 
City, Mo.,' being composed of letters somewhat 
sm'aller than those used in the rest of the descrip--
tion, but of blacker and more solid appearance, so 
that its correspondents could not fail to have their 
attention called to it; and that upon the state-
32 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
nwnts of its eondition it was dPserilwd as t:a• 
'lntPrnational Loan & Trust Co., of I~ansas City, 
~lo.' \Yith the exception of somP certificates of 
dqmsit, which we asstune were used in its corpo-
rate name, although there is no evidence to that 
pfft-('t, and the use of the words 'International 
Loan & Trust Co.,' as part of their connection 
with tlw sibrnature to its correspondence, there is 
nothing that shows that either the words 'of 
Kansas City' or 'of K_ansas City, nlo.' have not 
been invariably used in connection with the cor-
porate name. We think the fair result of this evi-
dence is that the words 'of Kansas City' or 'of 
Kansas City, Mo.' have formed almost as com-
ponent a part of the name actually used by the 
defendant in carrying on its businPss in this state 
as the words 'International' or 'Loan' or 'Trust.' 
And "·e do not see how a na1ne or title or descrip-
tion consisting of the words 'International Loan 
& Trust Company, of Kansas Cit~·,' or the same 
words 'vith the contraction 'Mo.' added, can be 
said to be the same as, ·or so nearly identical with 
'International Loan & Trust Company,' as to 
mislead. Two out of the four witnesses called by 
the plaintiff (being the only ones whose attention 
was directed to the matter) admitted that the ad-
dition of the words 'of Kansas Ciy' would remove 
any mnbiguity or trouble. It is not sufficient that 
some person might possibly be misled, but the 
similarity must be such that 'any person with such 
reasonable care and caution as the public gener-
ally are capable of using and may be expected to 
exercise would mistake the one for the other.' 
Gilman v. Hunnewell, 122 :Jfass. 139, 1-tS; Part-
ridge Y. :Jfenck, 2 Sandf. Ch. 625; Snowden v. 
X oah Hopk. Ch. 3-!7; l\IcLean v. Fleming, 96 r.S. 
2-!-3, :231; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Farmers' L. & 
T. Co. of l{ansas, 1 X.Y. Supp. -!-!;Gail v. \Vack-
erbarth, 2S Fed. Rep. 286." 
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The court then made the following disposition of the 
case: 
"The result upon the whole case, then is that 
the injunction is to be modified so as to restrain 
the defendant from doing under its corporate 
name any business in this state the same as or 
similar to that which the plaintiff is authorized 
to carry on, leaving the defendant free to engage 
in any business which its charter adn1its under 
the name of 'International Loan & Trust Com-
pany, of Kansas City,' or 'International L·oan & 
Trust Company, of Kansas City, Mo.,' and, as thus 
modified, the injunction is to issue." 
In the case of Federal Securities Co. v. Federal Se-
curities Corp., Supra, where the plaintiff sought to en-
join the defendant in the use of its corporate name, 
the Supreme Court of Oregon upheld the decree of the 
trial court which permitted the defendant to continue 
to do business in the State of Oregon but ordered the 
defendant to continue the practice of using the phrase 
"of Illinois" in connection with its name and directed 
that it should he printed in type, as large, at least, as 
the defendant's name and in an equally conspicuous place. 
D. Review of Evidence. 
(1) Nature of Businesses Involved. 
A review of the evidence demonstrates that the case 
should be governed hy the legal principles discussed. 
It is first noted that the parties are not common or-
dinary businesses dealing with the general uninformed 
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public. rrlw DPft-ndant is a title insurance cmnpany. The 
Plaintiffs are tit IP insurance ageneit-s. Insofar as title 
in~urance eompanit-s and title insurance agencie~ an· 
('oncerned, tht- eustomer clientele is largely 1nade up 
of Pxperts and professional personnel such as ban:ks, 
~avings and loan cmnpanies, insurance companies, other 
lending institutions, persons engaged in the real estate 
business, and lawyers, etc. (T. 374) . 
• J P~se Ellertson, the president of Title Insurance 
.\gPney of t:tah, Inc., one of the prominent title insur-
ance agencies of this state, testified that 95% of his 
bu~int>ss comes from such professional sources (T. ±37). 
Ut>orge Stanley of the Stanley Title Company, Defend-
ant's agent, testified that only 12 out of the last 1140 
jobs done came frmn non-professional sources (T. 376); 
and :J[ark Eggertsen, president of Plaintiff companies 
l'Yen conceded that about 75 to 80% of his business like-
'vise eame from that source ( T. 212). 
(~) Parties Are Not in Competition. 
Furthermore, it is to be noted that the Defendant is 
a title insurance emnpany engaged in the business of ac-
tually issuing title insurance policies ( T. 313). X either 
of the Plaintiffs are title insurance companies, but are 
mere title insurance agencies engaged in the business 
of dealing in land titles, abstracts and acting as agents 
for title insurers (T. 1:2-!-128). Hence, strictly speaking, 
the Plaintiffs and Defendant are not engaged in compe-
tition. "\\1Iile this n1ay not be decisive, it is a factor. See 
66 A.L.R. 934, 964, 967. 
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(3) Words, "Security" and "Titl~" are Ge:neric and 
in Common Use. 
In addition the words, "security" and "title," are 
both generic or descriptive words in common use (T. 18:2-
183). This again, while not a decisive factor, is a matter 
to be considered for a greater similarity in names will 
be tolerated when names are geographical or descriptive 
than where the first corporation's name is fanciful and 
arbitrary. See Federal Securities Co. v. Federal Securi-
tie.s Corporation, Supra. 
( 4) No Confusion inN early Two Y e,ars. 
The most remarkable fact about the case at bar is 
that in nearly two years of operation by the Defendant, 
there has not been one instance of confusion. By the 
time the three-day trial of the case had been concluded, 
the Plaintiffs had failed to point to one single instance of 
confusion that had arisen since the Defendant qualified 
to do business in March of 1961. 
The lack of confusion was even admitted by Mark 
Eggertsen, who on cross-examination conceded that since 
the Defendant had been doing business in this state, 
there was no known instance of confusion between the 
Defendant, the Plaintiff companies, and the Stanley 
Title Company as the Defendant's agent. Mark Eggert-
sen's testimony was as follows: 
"Q. Do you know of any instance where any-
one has actually ordered a policy or abstract and 
then because of your contact with them you have 
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IParned that tlwy thought in the course of the 
whole tran~adion they wPn' dealing with the Se-
eurity Title Insurance Company of California~ 
"A. No. Unless some of their own offices 
who have referred business to us 1night have 
thought so. 
"Q. But you don't know of no individual 
that - at least no information has come to your 
attention that thought they were dealing with Se-
eurit~· rritle Insurance Company when they ac-
tually were dealing with your office~ 
.. A. Oh, I couldn't say. It is very possible 
they could have. 
"Q. I know. But you don't know of any 
instance¥ 
''A. No. 
"Q. Do you know of anyone who has dealt 
with your office and in the course of the trans-
action it became apparent to you that they thought 
they were dealing with somebody connected with 
~Ir. Stanley here in the City~ In other words, 
that have thought that you were connected ·with 
or associated in any way with the Stanley Title 
Company? 
''A. The only confusion we have had in that 
respect to this point is that one or two of these 
institutional offices have called and said that :ilfr. 
Stanley had approached them in the solicitation 
of business, and named the company, that is, the 
defendant, as his underwriter, and was there any 
relationship between them and us~ 
··Q. All right. Do you know of any of those 
that· :have ever ordered a policy or have ever 
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ordered an abstract and a policy has ultimately 
been issued~ In other words a transaction com-
pleted in your office wherein it became apparent 
to you by what was said or done that the person 
with whom you were dealing thought he was deal-
ing with Mr. Stanley~ 
"A. No-truthfully no. And I know what 
you are heading to, but go ahead." (T. 214-215) 
"Q. Do you know of anyone who has pur-
chased any policy of title insurance, or arrranged 
for any policy of title insurance, or abstract, 
through the Stanley Title that you have later met 
and discussed the matter with and from what was 
said or done at least you concluded that the per-
son was confused and had mistaken Mr. Stanley's 
operation for yours~ 
"A. No." (T. 216) 
"Q. I take it that what you really have in 
mind, Mr. Eggertsen, is that there has been to 
date no basic confusion and what you really want 
to avoid is a probability of confusion in the years 
to come~ 
"A. Yes. I knew you were leading up to 
that." (T. 218-219) 
Nor has there been so much as one instance of confusion 
in the office of Defendant's agent, the Stanley Title Com-
pany (T. 381, 382, 383,448,449,456,457, 458). 
Not one of the Plaintiffs' witnesses had ever been 
confused, nor did any of them know of any confusion that 
had resulted from the Defendant doing business in the 
state through Stanley· Title Company. 
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F1) X(·ithcr Is Thl're Any Reasonable Probability 
of Confllsion In The Future. 
a. 1\?o Co-nfusion in Nearly Tzro Years. 
The nearly two-year history of no confusion certain-
ly Pvidences lack of any probable confusion in the future. 
b. Analysis of 1Ya111es hl.voh·ed. 
The Court's attention is again invited to the names 
involved. The Plaintiffs' names are "Security Title COin-
pany" and "Security Title Guaranty Company," the latter 
name being a recent change froin "Security Title Insur-
ance Agency." The name, "Security Title Company," 
give8 no implication whatsoever that it is a title insur-
ance company or that the company has anything to do 
with insurance. The nrune, "Security Title Insurance 
Agency,'' clearly evidences that that company is not a 
title insurer, but that its activities are devoted solely to 
those of an agency. Indeed, since both of the Plaintiff 
companies are mere title insurance agencies, it would 
be tmlawful for either company in any way to hold itself 
out as a title insurer. Section 31-5-15, l-:-tah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, provides as follows: 
"31-5-15. Name in which business condticted-
Subrogation - Limitations on assumption of 
name. - (1) Each insurer shall conduct its busi-
ness in its own legal name, except that in subroga-
tion actions it may sue in the name of its assured. 
(2) No insurer shall assume or use a name 
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( 3) No person who is not an authorized in-
surer shall assume or use any name, which de-
ceptively infers or suggests that it is an insurer." 
(See also Section 31-Z7 -6, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953.) 
On the other hand the Defendant's name unmist~­
edly shows that it is a title insurance company. 
(c) How Defendant lias Actually Used Its Name. 
But that is not all. The Defendant has, in addition, 
always used the further identifying words, " ... of Los 
Angeles, California." There has been no attempt what-
soever to infringe on the business of the Plaintiff com-
panies. The Defendant has engaged in no advertising 
whatsoever calculated -to confuse its business with that 
of the Plaintiffs. It has done business through its local 
agent, Stanley Title Company, and it is the latter name 
which has been prominently used. Reference is made to 
Exhibit 23 which shows the business location of Stanley 
Title Company and the use of that name, "Stanley Title 
Company," in large letters as identifying the business 
operated by George Stanley. The Defendant's name ap-
peared only in small print in the lower right-hand corner 
of the window and was used in connection with other 
words clearly identifying its agency relationship to 
Stanley Title Company and its location as being in Los 
Angeles, California. 
It must be re1nembered that it is the local title in-
surance agencies which procure business for the title 
insurance carriers. The title insurance carriers them-
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~wlvrs have little contaet with the general public, but 
rather rely on local insuranee ageneit~s to procure busi-
ness for them. By the time prelin1inary title reports are 
ordered and issued, contacts with the title insurance 
ageneiPs have been such that the chanees for confusion 
resulting thereafter are nil. 
rrhe Defendant has only permitted the use of its name 
on title insurance binders, on policies of title insurance, 
on letterheads of Stanley Title Company, and on the 
window of Stanley Title Company. In each instance its 
:-\tatus as an insurance company as such and its agency 
relationship to the Stanley Title Company has been 
apparent. 
The Court's attention is again invited to the cases 
where the use of silnilar names was permitted so long 
as the companies added or continued to add the location 
identification such as: "of Canada" (Saunders v. Sun L. 
Assur. Co. (189-1) 1 Ch. (Eng.) 537, noted in 66 A.L.R. 
!l-l~. !lS3); "of K.ansas" (International Trust Co. v. Inter-
national Loan & T. Co. (1891) 153 ~\lass. 271, 10 L.R.A. 
15S, 26 ::\!".E. 693); and "of Illinois" (Federal Securities 
Co. r. Federal Securities Corp., 276 P. 1100, 66 A.L.R. 
934). 
(d) Pert:inent Testimony of Each Witness Reviewed. 
As already pointed out, not one of the witnesses had 
ever been confused, and not one of them testified that he 
knew of any confusion that had resulted from the De-
fendant's doing business through the Stanley Title Com-
41 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pany. "\Yhen asked to give their opinions, all of the wit-
nesses, with one exception, testified that based on their 
experience, there would be no confusion among those who 
generally deal with title insurance companies. The JWr-
tinent testimony of each witness who testified on the 
question of confusion and the probability of confusion 
in the future is as follows: 
M.ark Eggertsen: 
Mark Eggertsen was responsible for and is the 
president of both of Plaintiff companies (T. 121, 122, 
128, Exhibits 20, 21). He knew of no confusion up to 
the time of the trial (T. 215, 218). His position was that 
he just wanted to avoid the probability of confusion 
in the future ( T. 219). 
Don H. Henager: 
Don H. Henager 1s the secretary-treasurer of the 
Plaintiff, Security Title Company (T. 243). He testified 
that there had been some confusion in his mind resulting 
from the doing business in this state of the Defendant, 
Security Title Insurance Company, by reason of mail 
addressed to "Security Title Insurance Company" at the 
Plaintiffs' address (T. :2-15). He stated, however, that he 
always opened such mail (T. 262) and that in not one 
instance had he found any mail that was actually in-
tended for the Defendant (T. 262). Nor did he know of 
any instance where any mail had been sent to the Defend-
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L~tcille R. lJ'right: 
Lueillt- R. \Vright is the vice president of Security 
'l'itle Guaranty Company and senior vice president of 
~P<'urity Title Co. (T. 269). She testified that she had 
been requesh•d by .Mr. Allen l-1. Tibbals to take samples 
ot' mail addressed to the office of the Plaintiffs in the 
name of ··8ecurity Title Insurance Oompany" (T. 276). 
Exhibit No. 32 contained four of such samples (T. 276). 
On cross-examination she admitted, however, that none 
of the envelopes caused any confusion (T. 276-279). She 
further testified that the persons who route the title 
insurance are generally familiar with the title insurance 
agencies ( T. 282). 
Pat rick J. Sullivan: 
Patrick J. Sullivan is the vice president of the Mc-
Ghie Abstract & Title Company of Salt Lake City ( T. 
283). He was asked if having two companies using the 
words, "Security Title" created confusion. The Defend-
ant's objection to the question was overruled and Mr. 
Sullivan stated: "I would think so." (T. 285-286). He 
stated that mail addressed in the name of "Security 
T.itle Insurance Company" without any address or any 
identification would, after the Defendant's having com-
menced doing business, be confusing to him ( T. 287). He 
was asked whether the industry would find it confusing to 
have two companies utilizing the words "Security Title" 
in business (T. 288). Objection was again made on the 
ground that the question called for a conclusion and on 
the further grounds that there was no characterization 
as to how the words might be used. He answered that he 
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thought it would be confusing (T. 288). Yet he testi-
fied that he was well aware of the fact that the Plaintiffs 
were not insurance cmnpanies (T. 290). He was aware 
of the fact that to address either of the Plaintiff corpora-
tions as "Security Title Insurance Company" would be 
totally in error (T. 290). Exhibit No. 32 was not confusing 
to him (T. 290). Then :Mr. Sullivan admitted that as to 
whether or not there would be any confusion in the use 
of the words, "Security Title" would perhaps depend on 
how the words were used ( T. 290). If other words were 
used with "Security Title" for identification, it might 
be such as to cause no confusion ( T. 291). He confirmed 
the fact that the bulk of title insurance is ordered by 
people in banks, lending institutions, insurance compan-
ies, real estate agencies, lawyers, etc. (T. 292). His at-
tention was then directed to Exhibit No. 23 (T. 291), and 
over objection of Plaintiffs' counsel he finally admitted 
that he wouldn't think such a use would confuse the peo-
ple who usually order title insurance (T. 292). Then 
he took an apparently inconsistent position and testi-
fied that the same words as are on the window of Stanley 
Title Company would to a lot of people be confusing on 
preliminary title reports and policies; that is, the words, 
"Security Title," make it confusing, and such identifica-
tion wouldn't make it completely clear because there 
were a lot of people in Salt Lake City "that thinks the 
name of Security Title Company of Salt Lake City is Salt 
Lake City Title Insurance Company, since they ordered 
policies from them. I would think the whole thing is 
rather confusing to the general public." (T. 293). How-
ever, if by a "lot of people" :Mr. Sullivan meant people 
other than the professional clientele we have referred 
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to, then his testimony may not be inconsistent. On eross-
Pxamination he adn1itted, however, that he had never been 
eonfuHPd ( T. 295). 
ln evaluating iltr. ~ullivan's testimony it is apparent 
that he had never been confused, nor had he heard of 
anyone who had ever been confused. In what context 
the words "Security Title" were used would be signifi-
cant. He was certainly inconsistent when he stated that 
the words on the window would not be confusing, but 
~tated that the same words on the preliminary title re-
ports and title insurance policies would be confusing to a 
ulot of people," unless he meant people other than the 
professional clientele. The fact that the Plaintiffs re-
ceived 1nail addressed in the name of "Security Title 
Insurance Company" cannot be of any help to the Plain-
tiffs in this case, as such name is not the corporate name 
of either of the Plaintiffs and simply evidences an ig-
norance in the minds of the senders of such 1nail as to the 
nature of the business and the correct names of the 
Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs must stand or fall on their own 
corporate name (Central Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Central 
.1/ut. Ins. Co., Supra). As already pointed out, the stat-
utes of this state prohibit a person or company not an 
insurance company from using any name that infers that 
it is such (Sec. 31-5-15 and Sec. 31-27-6, U.C.A., 1953). 
Since it would thus be illegal for the Plaintiffs to use 
the name "Security Title I nsur,ance Company," the Plain-
tiffs cannot claim the benefit of such name when they 
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As a further aid to evaluating Thlr. Sullivan's te:-~ti­
mony, the trial court should have and this court ought to 
take into consideration that he was a client of counsel 
for the Plaintiffs (T. 298). 
Glen M. Acomb : 
Mr. Acomb is a member of the bar of this state and 
Chief Deputy Salt Lake County Recorder (T. 299). 1\lr. 
Acomb was asked if another company were to utilize in 
the land title field or title insurance field the words "Se-
curity Title," whether this would, in his opinion, create 
any confusion in the office of the County Recorder. (T. 
300). 
The Defendant's objection to the question was over-
ruled and Mr. Acomb replied that he thought it would; 
that in the processing of documents and the return of 
documents, just the name of Security Title is shown 
and that would be confusing if there were two companies 
of the same nan1e. ( T. 300). 
He testified further that docrnnents bearing the 
words "Security Title Insurance Company," "Security 
Title Guaranty Company," and "Security Title Agency" 
would be sent to the Plaintiffs (T. 300). However, on 
cross-examination, he testified that the identification 
of the Defendant on the window of Stanley Title Com-
pany would not be confusing to the public who generally 
deal with title insurance matters (T. 302). Neither 
was Exhibit No. 15, one of Stanley Title Company's pre-
liminary report forms, considered by him to be confusing 
(T. 303). Incidentally, the Preliminary Report Form, 
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~xhibit No. 15, has been superseded by a newer form 
Pven further retnoved fr01n the possibility of confusion 
rr. 388, 396, 397). The words "Security Title" used as 
they were on the window and title insurance policies, 
with other words identifying and distinguishing the De-
fendant company, would not be confusing (T. 303). The 
cn1x of the whole question was summed up in his ob-
servation on cross-examination to the effect that whether 
or not there would be confusion would depend on how 
the words were used ( T. 303, 304). 
JVcston Garrett: 
:\lr. Garrett is the manager of Security Title and 
Ab~tract Company in Provo, Utah (T. 305). He testi-
fied that he knew of no instances of confusion in the 
Provo area between the Plaintiff and Defendant com-
panies (T. 308). In his opinion the words "Security Title" 
identified his company in that area; that is, the Se·curity 
Title and Abstract Company. 
:Jir. Garrett's testimony could be of little help to the 
Plaintiffs for not only did he know of no confusion, but 
there was nothing to show from his testimony that there 
would be any probability of confusion by the Defendant 
in using its corporate name with the further identifying 
and distinguishing words that have already been re-
ferred to. 
Gordon Gurr: 
:Jir. Gurr resides in Kaysville, Utah, and now main-
tains an office in Farmington, Utah, where he oper-
ates the intermountain division of the Plaintiff Security 
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Title Company ( T. 310). He was asked on direct exam-
ination if the Defendant corporation were to be per-
mitted the unlimited use of its corporate name, "Secur-
ity Title Insurance Company," whether, in the best of his 
judgment and experience as an abstracter and title man, 
this would cause any confusion with respect to the 
Plaintiff companies. (T. 312-313). Over objection, he 
testified that his company had used the words "Security 
Title" by themselves for so long that if someone else 
used these names this would be confusing ( T. 313). 
Such testimony can be of little help to the Plaintiffs 
for the Defendant has never undertaken "the unlimited 
use" of its corporate name. Neither has it ever used the 
words "Security Title" by themselves. The Defendant 
has always been careful in the use of its name, has always 
used further identifying and distinguishing words in con-
nection with its corporate name, and has never used the 
words "Security Title" by themselves. 
Raymond G. Willie : 
l\Ir. Willie is a Vice President of the First Security 
Bank of Utah in the Mortgage Division (T. 355). He 
stated that the bank had ordered and requested title in-
surance from the Plaintiff, which company he referred to 
as "Security Title Insurance Qompany" (T. 356). He 
stated that he refers to l\Ir. Eggertsen's company as 
"Security Title Insurance Company" (T. 356). He states 
that Mr. Eggertsen's company is commonly referred to 
in the bank as ''Security Title Insurance Company" (T. 
356). l-Ie stated that he had never actually inquired as 
to whether or not "Security Title Insurance Company" 
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was the correct name of the Plaintiffs' company (T. 356). 
That he had never particularly cared (T. 356). He stated 
that Mr. Stanley had solicited the bank's business, but 
he had no recollection of Mr. Stanley having solicited 
through the name of the Defendant company. He was 
then asked on direct examination : 
". . . do you find that the possibility of two 
companies doing business under the name of 'Se-
curity Title' in the State of Utah would be produc-
tive of confusion¥" (T. 358) 
Over objection he was allowed to answer the question 
and stated: 
•·wen, that is a very difficult question to 
answer, Mr. Tibbals. I am sufficiently familiar 
with title insurance that it doesn't confuse me. 
Yet, on the other hand, I can readily see where 
someone that wasn't, didn't order as many title 
policies as First Security might well be confused, 
yes." (T. 358-359) 
He was then shown Exhibit No. 32 and asked whether 
he would •• be able to tell from the name of the insurance 
company whether that is the company represented by 1\ir. 
Stanley or the one that is represented by Mr. Eggertsen." 
.. Xo, you couldn't," he replied, "the nan1es are identical 
except for the addresses." (T. 359). 
On cross-examination he admitted that he !knew of 
no confusion between the business conducted under the 
name of Stanley Title Company which had designated on 
its window "State Agent for Security Title Insurance 
Company," and the operation of Mr. Eggertsen at 45 
East Fourth South Street (T. 361). His attention was 
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directed to Exhibit No. 32 and reference was made to all 
of the identification on the envelopes and indicated that 
no confusion would be caused (T. 361). On cross-examin-
ation he was asked : 
"Now I was interested in your statement that 
you refer to the plaintiff company, Security Title 
Company, as Security Title Insurance Company, 
is that the way you refer to that company con-
sistently~" (T. 361) 
He replied: 
"That is right. They issue title insurance and 
that is what we order. Consequently we think of 
it in terms of Security Title Insurance Company." 
(T. 361) 
In summary Mr. Willie pointed to no confusion that 
has existed and confirmed the fact that First Security 
Bank had never been confused; and that Exhibit No. 32, 
considered as a whole, was not confusing. .Any confusion 
that did exist, as far as he was concerned, seems to stem 
from the fact that the Plaintiffs have permitted them-
selves to be erroneously identified in the public mind as 
an insurance company. .Again we emphasize that the 
Plaintiffs must stand on their own corporate names and 
cannot have the benefit of the Defendant's name or the 
benefit of other words suggesting that the Plaintiffs 
are insurance companies, whether such words are used 
intentionally by the Plaintiffs or carelessly by some un-
informed member of the public (Sec. 31-5-15, r.C.A., 
1953). 
On the same question of confusion or the probability 
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of eonfusion the Defendant's witnesses testified as fol-
lows: 
Ocorge B. Stanley: 
George B. Stanley is the President of Stanley Title 
Company, which company is the Defendant's agent in the 
~tatu of Utah (T. 363, 371). lie testified that the pro-
t'Pssional clientele is well acquainted with the title in-
:-;urance agencies (T. 376). He stated that 40 per cent 
of his title insurance business has been referred to rum 
up here in Salt Lake City by the Defendant company, 
and that he wants to identify his company as being the 
statl' agent for Security Title Insurance Company of Los 
Angeles (T. 377). He wanted it explicitly understood that 
he was but an agent of the California company (T. 378). 
He has never observed in handling the mail and telephone 
t'alls any confusion (T. 382). 
There simply has been no confusion ('T. 383). The 
use of tl1e name, "Security Title Insurance Company," 
as associated with other words of identification as pres-
ently used on the window, title insurance policies and 
preliminary title reports would not be likely to cause 
confusion (T. 384). 
Pa.ul JI endenhall: 
Paul :Mendenhall is engaged in the real estate busi-
ness and has been since 1954 ( T. 400). His business is 
Yery substantial (T. ±01). His attention was then directed 
to Exhibit :X o. 23 portraying the window of the Stanley 
Title Company (T. 404), and to the designation of the 
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Defendant in the corner of the window, and he was asked 
whether that was intended to cause any confusion in his 
mind; that is, the Security Title Insurance Company 
doing business through Stanley Title Company as com-
pared with Mr. Eggertsen's companies. His reply was 
"No" (T. 404). He was asked whether in his real estate 
transactions involving title insurance he had ever known 
of any case of confusion. Again his reply was ''No'' ( T. 
404-405). We then sought to elicit from Mr. Mendenhall 
the type of testimony that Mr. Tibbals had elicited from 
witnesses for the Plaintiffs by asking Mr. Mendenhall: 
"In your opinion would people who act in 
your capacity in this area; that is, the real estate 
people and among the circles in which you travel, 
in which you move, in your opinion and judging 
from your experience, would they be inclined to 
be deceived by the designation or identification 
of the title insurer on the window of Stanley Title 
Company~" (T. 405) 
:1\fr. Tibbals' objection to the question was sustained. 
He then testified that if similar words of identifica-
tion as appeared on the window of Stanley Title Com-
pany appear on title insurance policies or preliminary 
title reports, that such, as far as he was concerned, would 
cause no confusion. (T. 405). 
George W. Brown: 
:Mr. Brown is presently the manager of the Federal 
Land Bank Association of Provo, Utah (T. 407). The 
Federal Land Bank is involved in making real estate 
loans to farmers and ranchers, etc. ( T. 408). He testi-
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fied of the care and attention given by the Federal Land 
Bank to determining the qualifications of a title insur-
anee company (T. 409-410). He is familiar with a number 
of titlP insurance agencies and familiar with the parties 
in this action. He has had good business experience with 
both the Stanley Title Company and the Security Title 
& Abstract Company of Provo, which latter oompany is 
affiliated with the Plaintiffs (T. 410). He was well ac-
quainted with the Defendant company for whom the 
Stanley Title acts as an agent (T. 411). He has never 
been confused in his dealings with Stanley Title Com-
pany (T. -111). There has been no confusion in the way 
the Defendant, Security Title Insurance Company, i~ 
identified with the Stanley Title Company operation (T. 
412). He has never heard anything that would indicate 
that there has ever been any confusion in the dealings of 
the Federal Land Bank. Such confusion would normally 
be brought to the attention of the company ( T. 412-413). 
He testified that the words "Security Title" alone used by 
another company improperly could cause confusion ( T. 
413-414), but whether or not such confusion would exist 
would depend on how the words were actually used ( T. 
414). 
John W. Horsley: 
~Ir. Horsley is a local attorney who has practiced in 
this area for eleven years ( T. 418). He has handled a 
lot of real estate transactions and is well acquainted 
with the attorneys in this area (T. 418). Real estate 
transactions with which he has been connected have fre-
quently involved title insurance (T. 419). He testified 
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that title insurance companies were well known among 
attorneys here in the city (T. 420). When his client does 
not have a preference of a title insurance company, he 
frequently suggests one (T. 419). He was shown Ex-
hibit No. 23-the picture of the front window of the 
Stanley Title Company - and he testified that there 
would be no confusion caused by the Defendant being 
identified as the insurance company for whom Stanley 
Title Company acted as agent (T. 420, 421). He stated 
that there would be no confusion arise in his mind by 
the use of the words, "Security Title Insurance Company 
of Los Angeles, a California corporation," if those words 
appeared on a policy of title insurance issued through 
the Stanley Title Company or on a preliminary title re-
port as opposed to a title insurance policy issped through 
:Mr. Eggertsen's office (T. 421). He was asked whether, 
in his general experience in the profession among at-
torneys, as to whether there would he any deception 
caused thereby. He replied: 
"Well, I should think most lawyers would 
know the difference between an insurer and an 
agent." (T. 421) 
The difference between Mr. Stanley's title company and 
Mr. Eggertsen's, with the identification of the Defend-
ant as shown on the window of Stanley Title Company, 
would cause no confusion (T. 421). 
A. Melvin McDonald: 
Mr. McDonald has been affiliated with the Walker 
Bank and Trust Company since 1939, and is now a vice 
president of the bank in charge of real estate loans and 
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all of the branches of t11e bank ( T 0 424) 0 He supervises 
the real estatP loan division of the bank and approves real 
estate loans and the disbursing of funds in connection 
with real estate loans ( T 0 425). The real estate opera-
tion of the bank is of considerable magnitude (To 425)0 
He frequently finds himself dealing with title insurance 
ero -!~<i)o The bank always requests financial statements 
giving the financial status of title insurers (To 426)0 He 
was acquainted with the Plaintiffs, the Stanley Title 
Company, and was familiar with the fact that the De-
f£•rHlant was the insurer represented by the Stanley 
Title Company (To 427-428)0 His attention was directed 
to the photograph of the Stanley Title Company, Exhibit 
~ o. :2:~, and he stated that the same would cause no 
deception in his mind because he was perfectly familiar 
with the operation of both offices (T. 428)o He further 
h·~tified that judging from his experience and ba~­
ground in the mortgage loan business, that other men 
likewise engaged in such a capacity in institutions of 
the eity would likewise be familiar with both operations 
and not confused ( T. 428). He further testified that the 
identification of the Defendant as "Security Title Insur-
ance Company of Los Angeles, California," if it appears 
on a title report or title policy would not cause any con-
fusion to him or others similarly engaged (T. 428). He 
was not at all confused by Exhibi·t No. 32 ( T. 431). 
Jesse J/. Ellertson: 
~Ir. Ellertson is connected with the title insurance 
business and abstracting business and operates a com-
pany known as Title Insurance Agency of Utah, which 
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company has an underwriting agreement with the Kansas 
City Title Insurance Company. lie has been in the 
business for twenty years at the same address on Main 
Street in Salt Lake City (T. 434). His company is one 
of the well-established and older companies engaged in 
the business in this area (T. 434). He was acquainted 
with the parties in this case (T. 435). He pointed out that 
the clientele of his company generally comes from what 
he referred to as institutional business; that is, mort-
gage lending institutions, small loan institutions, the legal 
profession and real estate firms (T. 435). He is well 
acquainted with the title insurance agencies in this area 
(T. 436). His clientele is typical of the title insurance 
business (T. 436). Ninety-five per cent of his business 
comes from these institutional clients (T. 436). The 
institutional or professional clientele is very interested 
in the actual company that underwrites or issues the 
title insurance policies. He emphasized how important 
his affiliation with Kansas City Title was in selling his 
business ( T. 437). The ti tie insurance business is a 
service type of business ( T. 437), as opposed to buying a 
piece of merchandise wholesale and selling it retail (T. 
438). Title insurance businesses are not in the business 
of dealing with a commodity (T. 438). His attention was 
directed to Exhibit No. 23, the photograph of the front 
window of the Stanley Title Company, and particularly 
to the identification of the Defendant on the window. 
When asked whether such identification would cause 
deception among the clientele dealing with title insurance 
companies, he stated : 
"Oh, I wouldn't think so. There are occasions 
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but I don't think this would confuse anyone, the 
use of it that way." 
(\pitlwr would such words of identification on policies of 
title insurance cause any confusion ( T. 439). His at-
tention was then directed to Exhibit No. 35, a preliminary 
title report, and his attention was directed to the words, 
"Stanley Title Company," and other words identifying 
the Defendant, "State Agent for Security Title Insur-
ance Company of Los Angeles, California." He stated 
that among the clientele and personnel with whom he 
dealt and title insurance companies deal generally, such 
identification of the insurer would not cause deception 
or confusion. (T. 440). 
Paul B. Stanley: 
Paul Stanley is Vice President of Stanley Title Com-
pany, the agent for the Defendant company (T. 446). 
He comes in contact with customers or clientele served 
by the company ( T. +! 7). He processses the mail ( T. 
448), and frequently handles the telephone (T. 448). 
rrhere has never been any circumstance or observation 
that has led him to believe that there has been any con-
fusion (T. 4±8). There has never been any mail sent to 
the office of Stanley Title Company, the contents of 
which were obviously intended for the Plaintiffs (T. 
449). He has never seen as much as one piece of mail 
misdirected. He had never observed anything in any 
transaction that evidenced to him any confusion ( T. 449). 
Defendant's identification on the window of Stanley 
Title Company was, in his opinion, not calculated to 
cause any confusion among the people with whom they 
deal (T. +!9-450). 
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Azel T. Sorensen: 
Mr. Sorensen is engaged in the real estate business 
( T. 451). He has occasion to handle or be involved in 
placing orders concerning titles to property (T. -1-51). 
He stated that realtors generally place the title insur-
ance when the need for such arises in their transactions 
(T. 451-452). He and most real estate men are acquaint-
ed with the title insurance agencies ( T. 452). His atten-
tion was directed to Exhibit 23 and the words thereon 
identifying the Defendant. He stated that such never 
confused him ( T. 453) and neither would such words on 
preliminary title reports or title policies. He had known 
the Defendant company in Los Angeles, California (T. 
453). 
Burton M. Stanley: 
Burton M. Stanley is the Secretary-Treasurer and 
Title Officer of Stanley Title Company. He has consider-
able contact with clientele of the Stanley Title Company 
and accepts title insurance orders (T. 456). He does con-
siderable work over the telephone and likewise handles 
the mail. I-Iis desk is the first one to receive the mail ( T. 
456). Since the operation of Stanley Title Company as 
the agent for Defendant, he has never seen anything or 
had anything brought to his attention by any person 
which would indicate that there was any confusion (T. 
456-457). There has never been any mail misdirected 
(T. 457). There has never been anyone with whom he has 
dealt or with wh01n he has completed a transaction who 
has indicated that he was confused as to with whom he 
was dealing (T. 457). 
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T.ynn .11. 8tanley; Frances 1/arriL..,·on; George B. Stanley: 
Lynn ~1. Stanley of the Stanley Title Company was 
thPn called as a witness, whereupon Mr. Tibbals, counsel 
for the Plaintiffs, entered into a stipulation that Lynn 
M. Stanley would state that he had never been confused 
or heard of any party that had been confused, never 
h('ard of any confusion, and that there is nothing that 
i~ being confused (T. 458). The same stipulation was 
made applicable to Frances Harrison (T. 458), another 
employee of Stanley Title Company. 
It was then stipulated that if George B. Stanley were 
recalled to the stand, that he would state that this was 
all of his personnel in the organization that handles the 
mail, tPlephone, or clientele of the company (T. 459). 
By way of summary of all of the foregoing testimony, 
it is apparent that there has never been any confusion. 
X either have the Plaintiffs' witnesses carried the burden 
of ~howing that there is a probability of confusion arising 
out of the way the Defendant company has carried on 
it8 business thus far in the State of Utah. There is 
evidence that the use of the words "Security Title" alone 
might cause some confusion. There is testimony that the 
Plaintiffs have sometimes been referred to as "Security 
Title Insurance Company." Suffice it to say that the 
Defendant has never used the words, "Security Title" 
alone, but has always used its full corporate name and 
in addition other words of identification. Furthermore, 
it is again pointed out that the Plaintiffs have no right 
whatsoever to claim any benefit of the name "Security 
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Title Insurance Con1pany." If any of the public has been 
confused as to the status of the Plaintiffs and referred 
to the Plaintiffs or either of them as insurance com-
panies, then it can only be said that such misapprehen-
sion is the very thing that our statutes have been de-
signed to guard against. The Plaintiffs are not entitled 
to hold themselves out as insurance carriers (Section 
31-5-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). The Plaintiffs 
cannot identify themselves as "Security Title Insurance 
Company" for such is not the name of either company 
and to do so would be in direct violation of the statutes 
of this state. If the Plaintiffs cannot so identify them-
selves, certainly no benefit can flow to them by being 
so referred to by the careless and uninformed. 
(e) The Plaintiffs Must Stand Or Fall on Their 
Own Corporate N arnes. 
At the trial of the case the Plaintiffs introduced in 
evidence four envelopes (Exhibit No. 32) which had been 
received by the Plaintiffs. A. point was made of the fact 
that in three of the four instances the envelopes were 
addressed to "Security Title Insurance Company" at the 
Plaintiffs' address at 45 East 4th South Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Counsel for the Plaintiffs argued that 
the Plaintiff companies, having been thus identified in 
the minds of the senders of the envelopes, which persons 
represent a portion of the public, nothing but confusion 
would result from the Defendant pursuing its business 
in the State of Utah under its corporate name. 
The Plaintiffs, however, cannot claim the benefit 
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of any name other than their own corporate name. See 
Central J.llut. Au.to 1 ns. Co. v. Central Mu.t. Ins. Co., 
Supra, where the plaintiff claimed that notwithstanding 
its corporate name, it had become known by the name 
"Central :Mutual Insurance Company," and as "Central 
~lntual," and its insurance policies as "Central" policies. 
Said the court : 
HPlaintiff claims that notwithstanding its cor-
porate name, it has become known by the name 
'Central Mutual Insurance Company' and as 
'Central Mutual,' and its insurance policies as 
'Central' policies. This is immaterial. The plain-
tiff must stand or fall on its corporate name. The 
statutes above quoted recognize the corporate 
name only. Detroit Savings Bank v. Highland 
Park State Bank of Detroit, 201 Mich. 601, 167 
N.W. 895." 
The Court's attention is further invited to S€ctions 
31-5-15 and 31-27-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which 
provide that no person who is not an authorized insurer 
shall assume or use any name which deceptively infers 
or suggests that it is an insurer. Certainly the Plaintiffs 
cannot claim the benefit of the Defendant's own name by 
reason of any carelessness on the part of particular in-
dividuals. The Defendant is not an insurer against such 
ignorance or carelessness. The observation of the anno-
tator in 115 A.L.R. 1241, 1247, is in point: 
"And as supporting the further statement 
made in the original annotation that the test has 
frequently been said to be whether the similarity 
is such as to mislead a person using ordinary care 
and discrimination, attention is called to the 
following language in Central Mut. Auto Ins. Co. 
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v. Central Mut. Ins. Co. (1936) 275 :Mich. 554, 
267 N.W. 733: 'There may be some confusion re-
sulting from the similarity of the names of plain-
tiff and defendant, but the confusion of which the 
court takes cognizance must be something more 
than that resulting from carelessness or ignor-
ance on the part of the lminformed .... Defend-
ant is not an insurer against the ignorance or 
carelessness of particular individuals, and may be 
enjoined from the use of its corporate name after 
admission to do business in the state by the 
commissioner of insurance by that name, only 
upon a showing the similarity of its name to that 
of plaintiff will mislead, or probably mislead, the 
public to the detriment or injury of plaintiff.' See 
also United States Plywood Co. v. United Ply-
wood Corp. (1932) 19 Del. Ch. 27, 161 A. 913, 
where it was said: 'The name "United Plywood 
Corporation"ought not to be confused by any 
reasonably intelligent or ordinarily observant 
person with "United States Plywood Co."'" 
(6) The Case of B'/l)dget System, Inc. v. Budget 
Loan and Finance Plan, Infr,a, is Distinguish-
able. 
In reaching its decision the trial court relied on 
the case of Budget System, Inc. v. Budget Lo.an and Fi-
nance Plan, 12 U. 2d 18, 361 P.2d 512 (1961) (T. 461). 
In that case the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant 
loan company frmn using the word "budget" in its name. 
Since 1945 the plaintiff, Budget System, Inc., had oper-
ated a small loan business at 854 South State Street in 
Salt Lake City. Previously for about five years it had 
done business at 763 South State Street. The defendant 
corporation, Budget Loan and Finance Plan, continued 
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it~ ~mull loan business at 80~ South State ~treet, cmn-
mencing in ~ ovember, 1958. The trial court found that 
the word Bbudget" in defendant's name since 1955 had 
caused and would t'ontinue to cause confusion and de-
('t>ption to the public in the Salt Lake City area among 
prP~t>nt and potential custmners; that the similarity of 
tlw name was a deceptive use by the defendant, an unfair 
trade practice and would result in probable damage to 
plaintiff's business. The trial court rendered judgment 
in l'avor of the plaintiff and the decree was affirmed on 
appeal. rrhe case, however, is clearly distinguishable 
from the instant case in at least the following particu-
lars: 
(a) The en1ployees of the parties themselves, as 
well as patrons of each, had suffered actual confusion 
in tl1e separate offices. 
(b) The defendant emphasized the word "budget" 
in letterheads and outdoor electrical signs. 
(c) The appeal of both plaintiff and defendant busi-
nesses as small loan operations was to an undiscerning 
segment of the general public. 
(d) The plaintiff and defendant companies were in 
actual competition with each other. 
In ~hort, the businesses conducted by the parties in 
tJ1e Budget case were quite unlike the businesses involved 
in the instant case, which appeal to a skilled, professional 
clientele. In the Budget case there had been actual confu-
sion. In the instant case there has been no confusion. 
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In the Budget case the defendant had actually empha-
sized by the use of neon lights the name "Budget" which 
was the word in controversy. In the instant case the De-
fendant has clearly identified and distinguished itg busi-
ness from that of the Plaintiffs. In the Budget case 
there was an apparent intent to deceive the public. In 
the instant case there has been no such intent. In the 
Budget case the parties were direct competitors appealing 
to an undiscerning segment of the public. In the instant 
case the parties are not competitors and deal with a 
most informed part of the public. 
(7) Att,itude of the Defendant. 
The Defendant is a well-established title insurance 
company (T. 315). It has enjoyed a substantial growth 
('T. 315) and for meritorious reasons has qualified to 
do business in this state (T. 319). Expansion and diver-
sification are important to the welfare of the company 
( T. 319). The company has thought that confusion be-
tween its operation and the Plaintiff companies was 
quite unlikely ('T. 324). The absence of confusion since 
the Defendant has qualified in the state justifies the 
thinking of those responsible for the management of the 
Defendant. The management of the Defendant is very 
much interested in there being no confusion (T. 324). 
The Defendant, Security Title Insurance Company, is 
well known as a title insurer, enjoying an excellent pub-
lic image and reputation (T. 324-325). It is the fourth 
largest title insurance company in the United States, 
having a substantial financial position (T. 325). The 
Defendant does not wish to he confused with anyone, 
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partieularly when there cannot be any control over that 
person or company with whom confusion exists (T. 325). 
The Defendant has always used its full corporate 
name and in addition thereto appended additional words 
of identification and distinction. The testimony of Bruce 
JonP~, the Secretary and a Director of the Defendant, 
clearly sets forth the attitude of the company: 
"'N e wish to be known solely by what we do 
and what we are, and not by what anybody else 
does. And if we thought there was any chance of 
confusion we would take whatever steps we 
thought were necessary to eliminate it." (T. 325) 
The following testimony was then elicited from 
Bruce Jones. 
"Q. Now are you willing to take such steps 
then as you would consider reasonable to avoid 
any confusion between your company, the defend-
ant, and the plaintiff companies¥ 
"A. Anything that was reasonable and to 
the extent we felt at all necessary - yes, we 
would." ( T. 325) 
* * * 
"Q. I believe then your attitude is simply 
to identify yourself, is that correct¥ 
"A. That is correct." (T. 326) 
In other words, the Defendant having qualified with 
the Insurance Commissioner in this state simply desires 
to remain here and legitimately pursue its business, and 
is willing to take whatever steps necessary to identify 
and distinguish its operation from that of the Plaintiffs'. 
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POINT NO. II. 
THE FINDINGS MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT, EVEN 
IF PROPER, DO NOT SUPPORT THE BROAD INJUNCTION 
IMPOSED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. 
Even if the Findings as entered are proper, they do 
not support such a broad injunction against the Defend-
ant as was entered by the trial court. 
The Defendant has been restrained from "doing busi-
ness in the State of Utah under the name, 'Security Title 
Insurance Con1pany,' or under any name employing the 
words, 'Security Title' in any combination therein, or 
from using said name or words in the solicitation, conduct 
or carrying on of the business of abstracting, land title 
examination, title insurance or any related activity." 
It must be remembered that the Defendant has been 
authorized by the Insurance Commissioner of the State 
of Utah to do business in this state. The court in Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. All St,ate's Life Insurance Co., 246 F.2d 
161, 170, stated: 
"That a determination by such an administra-
tive tribunal is of great relevance and should be 
given great weight in a regulated industry." 
See also Central Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Central Mutual 
Insurance Co., 275 Mich. 554, 267 N.W. 733. 
As already pointed out in this brief, the Defendant 
should not be restrained from exercising this grant of 
authority unless in identifying itself in carrying on its 
business it has caused or will ljkely cause confusion. 
Assuming that the Findings as made were appropriate, 
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then the door should be left open for the Defendant to 
endeavor to further identify itself. See International 
Trust Co. v. lntern.ation.al Loan & Trust Co., 26 N.E. 693 
( ~Ia~~., 1891); Fa nncrs Lua n & T. Co. v. Far-mers Loan 
& 1'. Co., (1SS8) 21 Abb. ~\.C. 104, 1 N.Y. Supp. 44; 
8allndfrs v. 81111 L. As.-,ur. Co. (1894) 1 Ch. (Eng.) 537. 
The l)pfendant's corporate nmne is "Security Title 
lnsltrancf Company.'' This is the name by which it has 
qualified with the Insurance Cornmissioner to do busi-
m·~~ in the State of l Ttah. However, it has always further 
identified itself with such words as "of Los Angeles" or 
"a California corporation." If such words are inade-
quate to identify the Defendant, then the Defendant 
~hould be given an opportunity to clothe its name with 
additional identifying and distinguishing words to en-
tirely remove the possibility of confusion between the 
Defendant and either of the Plaintiff corporations. 
The Plaintiffs would like to have a n1onopoly on 
the words "Security Title" irrespective of the context in 
which used. This, of course, is wholly improper. All the 
Plaintiffs have a right to expect is freedom from actual 
or probable confusion. See Herring·-H.all-Marvin Safe 
Co. c. Hall's Safe Co., 208 U.S. 55±, 52 L.Ed. 616, 28 Sup. 
Ct. Hep. 350, 66 A.L.R 93-1, 942; L. E. TV·aterman Co. v. 
Jiodern Pen Co., :235 U.S. 88, 59 L. Ed. 1-1:2, 35 Sup. Ct. 
Rep. 91, 66 ..:-\.L.R. 934, 943. 
"The right of a corporation to protection 
against the use of the same or a similar name by 
another corporation is intunately connected with 
the right to protection for a trademark or a 
tradenan1e, and the right to protection against un-
fair competition. Indeed, in a great many in-
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stances, as will be hereafter noted, the prmci-
ples to be applied in the two classes of cases are 
practically identical." 66 A.L.R. 948, 950. 
If Finding No. 12 means that the use of the words 
"Security Title" alone are confusing, then the court is 
reminded that the Defendant has never so used the words. 
The Defendant has always used its full corporate name 
and then added further words of identification. 
If Finding No. 12 means that the words "Security 
Title'' in any conceivable context would be confusing, then 
such a finding is totally unsupported by the evidence, 
for the words at the trial were only considered in the 
context theretofore actually used by the Plaintiffs and 
the Defendant. Even if such testimony were in the 
record, such would be completely speculative. What wit-
ness could even state that the words "Security Title" 
would be confusing in any context~ And if such testi-
mony had been given, and it was not, the same would 
be rank speculation. To cite possible examples of the 
use of the words "Security Title" in a name used in a 
context that would clearly distinguish the name from the 
plaintiffs is simply to illustrate the obvious. 
The only use Finding No. 12 could refer to is the use 
of the corporate name alone or with the further identi-
fying words as actually employed by the Defendant, to-
wit, " ... of Los Angeles, California" or" ... a California 
corporation." As already pointed out and for the reasons 
noted, the Defendant contends that such use and identifi-
cation is sufficient. 
Finding No. 14 is patently valueless. What the De-
fendant "could" do or might possibly do is not sufficient 
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to Hustain the injunctive relief granted the Plaintiffs. 
( 'onfusion or probable confusion is the test. The dis-
tinction between "could" and "probable" from an eviden-
tiary standpoint is so well known to the law, and the 
insuffi<'iency of the former as a basis for a judgment so 
beyond dispute as to require no further comment. 
POINT NO. III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDING 
NO. 13 THAT "NO SUBSTANTIAL LOSS TO THE DEFEND-
ANT CORPORATION WOULD RESULT FROM DENIAL OF 
THE RIGHT TO THE USE OF THE NAME 'SECURITY 
TITLE' IN THE STATE OF UTAH." 
Finding No. 13 in its entirety is as follows : 
"13. Defendant corporation has to date 
written something less than 70 title insurance 
policies in the State of Utah calling for a pre-
mium income of less than $10,000.00. No substan-
tial loss to defendant corporation would result 
from denial of the right to it of use of the name 
'Security Title' in the State of Utah." 
Nothing in the record justifies the last sentence of 
the finding. 
The right of the Defendant to do business in the 
State of Utah now and in the years to come certainly 
cannot be measured by the policies issued or the premium 
income to date. Bruce Jones, the Secretary and a Director 
of Security Title Insurance Company, testified of the im-
portance to the company of its continuing to do busi-
ness in the State of Utah (T. 319). His testimony was un-
refuted. The company to date has gone to considerable 
expense and much difficulty in qualifying in Utah. Obvi-
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ously, as the economy of this state continues to increase 
so, likewise, will the value of the Defendant's right to do 
business in the state increase. 
SUMMARY 
In summary, the Defendant, Securit~· Title Insur-
ance Company, contends that the trial court committed 
error in 1naking Findings of Fact Nos. 12 and 14-, in 
m~king Conclusions Nos. 2 and 3, and in restraining the 
Defendant as was done. The Defendant has endeavored 
to use only its full corporate name and has always used 
additional words of identification. The nature of the 
Defendant's business in the manner in which it has en-
gaged in such has resulted in no confusion in nearly two 
:\'·ears. There is no reasonable probability of such in the 
future. Even if the Findings complained of were proper, 
the broad injunction imposed against the Defendant was 
not justified. The Judgment and Decree of the trial 
court in restraining the Defendant should be reversed 
and the Defendant should be permitted to continue its 
business in this state. 
Respectfull~r submitted, 
:Mci{AY AND BURTON 
~;d_t/4f1~}/ft~fA!~ ,'- -
Macoy A. McMurray 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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